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Overall Risk Rating:   Moderate Intended use:  Travel risk management, operational planning, duty of care Executive Summary Kazakhstan is a politically controlled state with limited tolerance for dissent and a track record of rapidly escalating unrest, demonstrated most notably during the January 2022 nationwide disturbances. The operating environment is generally stable in major urban centres, however risk is elevated by a combination of constrained civic space, corruption exposure, limited emergency response capability outside cities, and seasonal transport disruption driven by severe winter weather. For corporate travellers and operational teams, the most consistent risks are crime in major cities , movement and transport safety , and administrative/legal unpredictability . A general terrorism threat remains present, primarily from lone actors, with potential targeting of soft locations such as transport hubs and crowded public areas. While Kazakhstan is not currently involved in an active armed conflict, regional geopolitical dynamics (Russia/Ukraine and China’s western periphery) contribute to strategic uncertainty. Bottom line:  Kazakhstan is viable for business travel and market activity with appropriate controls, particularly around transport discipline, personal security in urban centres, and compliance governance. Risk Summary 1) Political – Moderate Kazakhstan operates an authoritarian, hybrid regime system. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has led since 2019 following the resignation of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who governed from independence in 1991. Political competition remains constrained, and public demonstrations require authorisation, with unauthorised activity historically met with enforcement action. Government reshuffles and administrative changes, including the appointment of a new prime minister in February 2024, signal responsiveness to economic pressures but also reinforce that decision-making is centralised and policy implementation can be uneven. Business impact:  policy volatility, heightened sensitivity to political activity, limited tolerance for protest, and reduced transparency. 2) Armed Conflict – Low Kazakhstan is not currently engaged in international armed conflict. Concerns persist around regional instability and long-term strategic risk linked to Russia’s posture in the region, but Kazakhstan remains closely tied to Russia economically and militarily, reducing the likelihood of direct confrontation in the near term. Business impact:  low direct conflict exposure, but geopolitical spillover can influence sanctions, supply chains, and investor sentiment. 3) Terrorism – Moderate A general terrorism threat exists nationwide, with heightened concern in southern and western areas. The principal threat is from lone actors inspired by extremist organisations. Potential targets include embassies, transport hubs, crowded public areas, and places of worship. Wider regional instability in Central Asia and China’s western periphery may contribute to long-term risk, though there is no immediate indication of a sustained escalation. Business impact:  soft-target exposure (events, hotels, airports) and the need for heightened vigilance during periods of unrest. 4) Crime – Moderate Crime risk is concentrated in major cities and is typically opportunistic. Petty theft, pickpocketing and bag snatching are common, especially in crowded areas and markets. Foreigners can be targeted in nightlife areas and by unlicensed taxis. There have been reports of airport “fake chauffeurs” meeting passengers and subsequently robbing them. Police corruption and limited assistance are persistent concerns. While kidnapping risk exists, incidents rarely affect foreign nationals and are more commonly financially motivated. Business impact:  personal safety risk for travellers, reputational risk, and reliance on controlled transport and accommodation procedures. 5) Civil Unrest – Moderate Public protests are not frequent, but the potential for sudden escalation remains. The January 2022 unrest, initially triggered by fuel price increases, resulted in violent clashes, looting, fatalities, and mass arrests. While conditions have stabilised, underlying grievances and political sensitivity persist, and authorities maintain strict control over assembly. Business impact:  disruption risk, movement restrictions, and heightened scrutiny of gatherings. 6) Maritime and Piracy – Negligible Kazakhstan has a limited maritime footprint via the Caspian Sea. There are no notable maritime security incidents affecting routine commercial activity. Strategic risk in the Caspian relates to broader regional militarisation rather than piracy. Business impact:  minimal for most corporate operations. 7) Health – Moderate Medical capability is below Western standards, particularly outside major cities. Shortages of drugs and equipment are possible and cash payment may be required. Ambulance services can be unreliable outside urban centres. Medical evacuation may be required in serious cases. Travellers should take precautions regarding food and water hygiene and consider relevant vaccinations for travel beyond major cities. Business impact:  duty of care exposure and the need for robust insurance and medevac planning. 8) Environmental – Low (with seasonal spikes) Kazakhstan faces seasonal hazards including severe winter weather (snowstorms, blizzards, icy conditions), occasional flooding, and wildfire risk. Kazakhstan also experiences air pollution issues in some urban centres. Earthquake risk exists, particularly around Almaty, though major events are infrequent and response capability is limited. Business impact:  weather-driven transport disruption and operational delays. 9) Transportation – Moderate Kazakhstan’s size and infrastructure variability create movement risk. Roads can be poorly maintained, hazards may be unmarked, and driving standards are inconsistent. Winter conditions significantly elevate accident risk. Rail travel is generally safe but robberies can occur on overnight services. Public transport can be crowded with pickpocket risk. App-based ride-hailing operates in major centres and is preferred over informal taxis. Certain areas are restricted without prior permission, including Gvardeyskiy (Almaty region), Baikonur, and districts of Karmakchi and Kazalinsk (Kyzylorda region). Business impact:  accident exposure, disruption risk, and the need for controlled transport. KAZAKHSTAN – MARKET ENTRY REPORT (SECURITY AND BUSINESS RISK) Purpose:  Support entry decision-making and define operating conditions, controls, and opportunities Scope:  Security, regulatory and integrity risk, geopolitical exposure, and operational resilience 1) Security Situation Overview What are conditions like on the ground? Conditions in Astana and Almaty are generally stable for business operations, with most risks being manageable through standard corporate travel controls. The security environment is shaped by tight state control, limited tolerance for dissent, and episodic unrest potential. What are the risks to staff and potential assets? Primary risks are: opportunistic crime (especially at night and around nightlife) civil unrest disruption (low frequency, high impact) transport accidents and weather disruption inconsistent emergency response outside major cities What factors could impact business continuity? Winter disruption, sudden unrest, and administrative constraints can rapidly affect movement and site access. 2) History and Future Risk of Expropriation / Nationalisation History (contextual): Kazakhstan has pursued foreign investment, but the state retains significant leverage through licensing, inspections, taxation, and regulatory enforcement. In environments with low transparency and centralised decision-making, commercial disputes can become politicised. Future risk outlook:   Moderate (sector dependent) Risk increases for: strategic sectors (resources, infrastructure, telecoms, sensitive data) projects requiring extensive permits or land access partnerships involving politically exposed actors What should the business do about it? structure entry in phases (avoid over-commitment early) use strong contractual protections and dispute planning maintain high documentation standards for compliance and performance consider political risk insurance where relevant 3) Foreign State-Backed Competitors and Geopolitical Risk What competitors exist in the region? State linked or state favoured firms (domestic and foreign) can hold advantage in procurement, licensing, and access to decision-makers, particularly in strategic sectors. Are certain countries’ companies favoured? In practice, firms with strong geopolitical alignment, established relationships, and state linked financing may face fewer obstacles. Russia and China remain key external actors. What does this mean for entry? competitive pressure may be shaped by politics, not only price/quality regulatory outcomes may depend on relationships and narrative positioning reputational risk exists if operations are perceived as aligned with a bloc 4) Local Crime What is the risk to staff? Moderate in major cities, driven by opportunistic theft, nightlife targeting, and taxi related scams. Foreign travellers may be assumed to carry valuables. Controls required: corporate transport only (licensed / app-based / pre-booked) no street taxis, avoid walking alone at night heightened vigilance in markets, public transport, and nightlife areas airport arrival protocol to prevent “fake chauffeur” scams 5) Rule of Law Can governing bodies be trusted to deal fairly? Enforcement can be inconsistent and influenced by local dynamics. Corruption exposure can affect policing and administrative processes. Legal outcomes may not be predictable in high-value disputes. What does this mean for the business? reduce reliance on informal arrangements maintain strong contracts, audit trails, and escalation routes plan for dispute resolution pathways early (including arbitration strategy) 6) Transparency of Licence Awards and Renewals How transparent are licensing processes? Transparency varies by sector and location. Licensing and inspections can create pressure points for delays, additional requirements, or solicitation. Key risk:  administrative leverageLicences and renewals can be used to influence business behaviour, especially where local discretion is high. Mitigations: map all permits and approvals before entry build realistic timelines and contingency buffers centralise government touchpoints to trained personnel only enforce “no facilitation payments” and document all interactions 7) State Capture by Local Elites Is state capture a concern? Elite influence can shape access to contracts, approvals, and enforcement outcomes, particularly in sectors linked to infrastructure, energy, extractives, or land use. What should the business do? avoid dependency on a single politically connected sponsor conduct enhanced due diligence on partners and beneficial owners include exit clauses and performance-based milestones monitor political turnover that could weaken protection networks 8) Risks to Supply Chains What factors could impact supply chains? winter weather disrupting roads and aviation geographic scale and limited infrastructure in remote areas customs friction and administrative delays reliance on single vendors or routes Mitigations: dual sourcing where feasible winterised logistics planning and buffer stock vendor performance KPIs and continuity clauses route risk assessments for regional movement 9) Compliance Risk What is the bribery and corruption risk? Moderate to high depending on operational footprint and sector. Key exposure points include inspections, policing, licensing, procurement, and logistics. How to manage it: third-party due diligence and ongoing monitoring clear policies for gifts, hospitality, and facilitation payment refusal training for staff on solicitation scenarios audit-ready payment controls and segregation of duties 10) Sanctions Risk What is the sanctions exposure? Risk is variable and depends on counterparties, logistics routes, and links to Russia related entities. Sanctions compliance becomes operational through who the organisation contracts, pays, and transports with. Controls: sanctions screening of counterparties and beneficial owners avoid restricted carriers and sanctioned entities document routing decisions and procurement rationale monitor changes in sanctions environment continuously 11) Opportunities Why enter Kazakhstan? Kazakhstan offers potential strategic value as a regional hub, with major urban centres capable of supporting corporate operations and a market that may offer competitive operating costs. Where opportunity is strongest: controlled operations in Astana / Almaty partnerships with reputable, well-vetted local firms sectors where regulatory exposure is manageable and not politically sensitive How to capture opportunity safely: phased entry and controlled footprint strong compliance posture as a differentiator resilience planning for winter disruption and administrative delay Market Entry Conclusion Kazakhstan is a viable market  for entry where the organisation can maintain control over movement, vendors, and compliance exposure . The highest risk is not routine violence, but administrative unpredictability, integrity risk, and episodic unrest . Entry should be structured to remain agile, defensible, and resilient, particularly through winter seasons and in any sector requiring extensive licensing.

Image: Chérif Konaté / VOA via Wikimedia Commons What’s happened? Following the calls from Niger’s military junta government [CNSP] (National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland) that all American troops must leave the country,[1] the Pentagon has now confirmed that they will withdraw its troops from the country, including Niger Air Base 201,[2] a $110 million drone airbase that the United States paid for. [3] What’s the background? In January 2013, the Niger government under President Mahamadou Issoufou approved a ‘status of forces agreement’ with the United States of America.[4] This paved the way for the development of a $110 million drone airbase just south-east of Agadez, a city geographically at the centre of the Niger and strategically located in the Sahel to monitor Islamic terror groups.[5] After the coup d’états in neighbouring Mali and Guinea in 2021 and Burkina Faso in 2022, Niger followed suit in overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Has Russia won? To quote Michal Langley, General of the United States African Command, it appears Russia is on the cusp of victory. Earlier in April this year he stated that several countries in the Sahel are on the precipice of being “captured by the Russian Federation”.[6] At an initial glance, it might seem to be the case. Like their fellow supplanters, Niger, following their coup, took similar steps in pushing out French soldiers from their country and formed closer with Russia. Within five months of a change in government, all French forces had departed Niger.[7] The following month in January 2024, the new Nigerien Prime Minister, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine and Defence Minister, Salifu Modi were having talks in Moscow about increasing military and economic ties.[8] It appears that meeting is already bearing fruit, as last month around 100 soldiers from the newly created African Corps, also known as the Russian Expeditionary Corps [REK] (successor to the Wagner Group) arrived in Niger to train the Nigerien army[9] with air defence systems.[10] Some of these soldiers are now based in Niger Airbase 101 which currently still has American soliders in residence.[11] Similarly, in neighbouring Mali, just as French troops left Menaka, Gossi and Timbuktu military bases in December 2023, Russian Wagner troops arrived to take their place.[12] Earlier that year in February, around 400 French soldiers left Burkina Faso following anti-French and pro-Russian protests in Ouagadougou.[13] However, despite this exodus, the United States and France still have military bases in Chad, with the latter having around a thousand soldiers[14] based in Chad’s capital N'Djamena, in Abéché to the east and Faya in the north.[15] Although, Chad has recently threatened to terminate the ‘status of forces agreement’ with America.[16] Yet, this may be just a ploy to obtain a better agreement given America’s lack of alternative countries in the region. Outside of military matters, again Russia’s influence can be seen growing through the decline of western mining companies across the region. Orono, a mining firm owned by the French government has stopped production of uranium in its mine near Arlit, due to sanctions against the Niger junta government.[17] This comes off the back that in May 2023, two months before the Nigerien coup, Orano had secured a deal to continue mining uranium until 2040.[18] In Chad, they have nationalised all of ExxonMobil's assets in the country.[19] In Mali, Russian soldiers have seized the Intahaka gold mine to the north of the country,[20] and now have their eyes on the Loulo-Gounkoto gold mine complex, 80% of which is owned by Barrick Gold, a Canadian firm on the New York Stock Exchange.[21] Furthermore, in a move to help their Russian allies slowly acquire one of the world’s top ten producing gold mines,[22] the military junta have created new regulations to the mining code.[23] The mining code stipulates that state will increase its revenues from the mining industry. A method suggested to achieve this is through increasing the state's interest in mining firms by increasing the 'free carried interest' from 10% to 35%.[24] And in Burkina Faso, Norgold, a Russian mining company, has a significant presence in the country, controlling the Bissa and Bouly mines.[25] On the other hand, many Western companies still operate across the Sahel. In February this year, the junta government in Conakry approved a joint development deal with Rio Tinto into Simandou, an iron ore mine.[26] And Halco, a firm based in America, owns 51% of CBG (Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée), the largest bauxite mining company in Guinea. In Burkina Faso, Lilium Capital, an investment banking firm based in Washington D.C. owns the Boungou and Wahgnion mines.[27] In addition, in March this year the military junta in Ouagadougou approved West African Resources Limited, a firm based in Perth, Australia, to mine in Toega and Sanbrado.[28] So, what's the verdict? Going back to General Michael Langley, he is right to suggest that Russia’s influence has significantly increased across the region, but to outrightly say that the region is ‘being captured by the Russian Federation’ would be incorrect. Unlike parts of Ukraine, Russia is not annexing territory to join its federation. Even if they wanted to, they would have to compete with the region's multiple non-state actors such as IS and Al-Qaeda in the Sahel (JNIM). Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that China has a significant presence in the area. China operates a bauxite mine in Guinea and a gold mine in Burkina Faso.[29] Through its CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and CNNC (China National Nuclear Corporation), China is the second largest foreign investor in Niger after France.[30] And in Mali, China controls 50% of Goulamina, a lithium mine in the south of the country.[31] Thus, with all these actors, and the potential that Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso could force Russia out just as they have with France and the United States, I would deem it premature at the least to state Russia has won in the Sahel. Why does it matter? Despite the presence of Western armed forces in the area for many years, the threat from Islamic insurgency remains ever-present. As recently as October 2023, 29 people died following a raid by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) in Tabatol, a village situated in the Tahoua region. This occurred less than a week after a separate attack where 12 soldiers were killed in Kandadji, an area of Niger which borders Burkina Faso and Mali, and has a strong presence of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups. With the removal of Western troops and the unlikelihood that Russian soldiers would be able to fill in the vacuum, due to the ongoing war in Ukraine taking precedence with troop numbers, the security situation across the Sahel, a region which accounted for 43% of the world’s deaths by terrorism[32] will probably deteriorate further. This will likely lead to more extreme violence and an increase in massacres as seen in the Central African Republic,[33] as Russian soldiers compensate for their lack of numbers. This will naturally provide ample reason for people to join the already present Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP),[34] thus extenuating the cycle. Besides the likelihood of more violence, you may be asking, how will Russia’s growing presence affect the West? Firstly, the migration crisis will deteriorate. The Sahel is a passage area for migrants travelling towards Europe. As of 2023 there are more than 700,000 migrants from 43 nations in Libya,[35] many of which have come through the Sahel which currently has 4.2 million displaced people.[36] As instability in the region grows, more people will flee the ensuing chaos of war and poverty aiming for Europe, thus extenuating a problem which the continent is trying to grapple with as seen with the recent calls of 19 EU nations calling for a Rwanda return scheme like the UK.[37] To make matters worse, as Russian influence in the Sahel increases, they will likely further add to the migration issue as tactic to destabilise Europe according to Frontex, the European Union’s border and coast guard agency.[38] This has already being seen in Finalnd, prompting the nordic nation to close its land borders facing Russia.[39] Secondly, this will affect Western mining firms. As violence and instability increase, so will the cost of operating in the area, from an increase in security personal costs, to a decrease in outside investment. This perhaps may lead to firms offloading assets in the Sahel and merging with rivals to source raw materials in safer countries as seen with BHP’s buyout proposal to Anglo-American.[40] Furthermore, mining firms will come under the political microscope and potentially face sanctions for working with military juntas who have ties with Russia. Barrick Gold fell into this following a report from the Blood Gold Report stating that it pays the Malian military junta $120 million a year to operate the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex.[41] More trouble on the horizon? Despite the climbdown from Nigeria’s President Bola Tinbu’s threat of invading Niger following its coup and departure of Ecowas for the ‘Alliance of the Sahel States’ instead,[42] the potential for further conflict remains on the horizon. As Russia has consolidated control across the Sahel, it has also done so in Libya, earning up to $5 billion in oil revenues with the help of its circa 2000 soldiers in the country.[43] As a result, the West has belatedly awoken to this macabre reality, as seen with the United States slowly forging a military foothold in the country to counter Russian influence, with rumours[44] that it was behind attacks on the Al-Kharruba airbase in June 2023[45] and in Al Jufra airbase in December 2023.[46] What does this mean for the Sahel? Following the Nigerien junta’s recent meeting with Iran regarding the sale of 300 tonnes of uranium[47] within the background of worsening ties between Israel and Iran, this may force the United States to take decisive action across the region as a whole to bring it back into its sphere of influence. Footnotes [1] BBC News, “Niger’s Junta Revokes Military Agreement with US,” BBC News, March 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68590531. [2] Carol Valade and Morgane Le Cam, “American Troops Withdraw from Niger While Facing Pressure from Chad,” Le Monde.fr, April 22, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/04/22/american-troops-withdrawing-from-niger-while-facing-pressure-from-chad_6669114_124.html. [3] Joe Penney, “Drones in the Sahara: A Massive U.S. Drone Base Could Destabilize Niger - and May Even Be Illegal under Its Constitution,” The Intercept, February 18, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/. [4] “Niger (13-128) - Agreement on Defense Status of Forces - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, January 28, 2013, https://www.state.gov/13-128. [5] Penney, “Drones in the Sahara,”. [6] Emma Ogao and Morgan Winsor, “US to Withdraw Troops from Niger after Military Deal Revoked,” ABC News, April 25, 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-plans-withdraw-troops-niger/story?id=109568976. [7] Al Jazeera, “Last Set of French Troops Exit Niger as Sahel Sheds Parisian Influence,” Al Jazeera, December 22, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/22/last-set-of-french-troops-exit-niger-as-sahel-sheds-parisian-influence#:~:text=The%20last%20French%20troops%20in,Salim%20Ibrahim%20said%20on%20Friday. [8] Maxim Rodiono and Jonathan Oatis, “Russia and Niger Agree to Develop Military Ties, Moscow Says | Reuters,” ed. Ron Popeski, Reuters - World, January 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/. [9] Ogao et al, “US to Withdraw Troops,”. [10] A.Y. Barma, “Coopération Militaire: Pendant Que Les Américains, à La Suite Des Français, Sont Poussés à La Porte, Les Russes Débarquent Au Niger,” Actu Niger, April 12, 2024, https://www.actuniger.com/politique/20036-cooperation-militaire-pendant-que-les-americains-a-la-suite-des-francais-sont-pousses-a-la-porte-les-russes-debarquent-au-niger.html. [11] Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Russian Troops Enter Base Housing US Military in Niger, US Official Says,” Africa, May 3, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-enter-base-housing-us-military-niger-us-official-says-2024-05-02/. [12] Al Jazeera, “Last Set of French Troops,”. [13] Thiam Ndiaga, “Burkina Faso Marks Official End of French Military Operations on Its Soil,” Africa, February 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/. [14] Staff Writer With AFP, “French Troops to Stay in Chad: Macron Envoy,” The Defense Post, March 8, 2024, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/08/french-troops-stay-chad/. [15] Mamadou Faye, “Why Does France Have Military Bases in Africa?,” BBC News, November 6, 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67278027. [16] Haley Britzky, Oren Liebermann, and Natasha Bertrand, “Chad’s Government Threatens to Kick out US Troops as Russia Expands Influence in Africa | CNN Politics,” CNN, April 18, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/18/politics/chad-us-troops-threat/index.html. [17] Francois De Beaupuy, “Orano Halts Uranium Ore Processing at Nigerian Plant Due to Sanctions on Junta,” Bloomberg.com, September 8, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-08/orano-halts-uranium-treatment-in-niger-amid-sanctions-on-junta. [18] AfricaNews, “Niger: Uranium Mine Set to Operate until 2040,” Africanews, May 4, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/04/niger-uranium-mine-set-to-operate-until-2040/. [19] Reuters, “Chad Says It Has Nationalized All Assets Owned by Exxon Mobil,” Energy Exploration & Production Refining, March 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chad-says-it-has-nationalized-all-assets-owned-by-exxon-mobil-2023-03-23/. [20] Staff Writer, “Barrick under Pressure in Mali as Regime Eyes Control of Loulo-Gounkoto,” Mining.com, April 15, 2024, https://www.mining.com/barrick-under-pressure-in-mali-as-regime-eyes-control-of-loulo-gounkoto. [21] Barrick Gold, “Barrick Gold Corporation - Operations - Loulo-Gounkoto,” Loulo-Gounkoto Mali, accessed May 2, 2024, https://www.barrick.com/English/operations/loulo-gounkoto/default.aspx. [22] Staff Writer, “Loulo-Gounkoto to Remain among World’s Top 10 Gold Producers – Bristow,” Mining.com, October 8, 2023, https://www.mining.com/loulo-gounkoto-to-remain-among-worlds-top-10-gold-producers-bristow. [23] Staff Writer, “Barrick under Pressure,”. [24] Adrien Canivet and Augustin Barrier, “The Impact of Mali’s Revised Legislation on Foreign Mining Companies,” Lexology, October 19, 2023, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d34f08f2-c46a-4d50-8669-932a49dc1a4a#:~:text=The%20New%20Mining%20Code%20was,gold%20shine%20for%20the%20Malians%E2%80%9D. [25] Reuters, “Burkina Faso Denies Favouring Russia’s Nordgold over Gold Mine Permit | Reuters,” Africa, February 6, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-denies-favouring-russias-nordgold-over-gold-mine-permit-2023-02-06/. [26] Reuters, “Guinea Approves Joint Development Deal for Simandou Iron Ore Project,” Commodities, February 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/guinea-approves-joint-development-deal-simandou-iron-ore-project-2024-02-04/. [27] Mining Review Africa, “Endeavour Mining Sells Boungou and Wahgnion Mines,” Miningreview.com, June 30, 2023, https://www.miningreview.com/gold/endeavour-mining-sells-boungou-and-wahgnion-mines/. [28] Jane Bentham, “West African Resources Receives Mining Permit Approval,” Global Mining Review, March 27, 2024, https://www.globalminingreview.com/mining/27032024/west-african-resources-receives-mining-permit-approval/. [29] Aki Elborzi, “China’s Non-Interference Principle and the Military Coups in Africa: A Clash With the African Union?,” SOAS China Institute, February 28, 2024, https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/2024/02/28/chinas-non-interference-principle-and-the-military-coups-in-africa/. [30] Elborzi, “China’s Non-Interference,". [31] Elborzi, “China’s Non-Interference,". [31] Mark A. Green, “The Sahel Now Accounts for 43% of Global Terrorism Deaths,” Wilson Center, May 16, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sahel-now-accounts-43-global-terrorism-deaths. [33] Guy Birchall, “The African Nation Where Prigozhin’s Wagner Group Has Been ‘Perfecting a Nightmarish Blueprint for State Capture,’” Sky News, June 28, 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/wagner-group-responsible-for-torture-killings-and-rampant-exploitation-of-resources-in-africa-12910193. [34] Center for Preventive Action, “Violent Extremism in the Sahel | Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 14, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel#:~:text=Organizations%20including%20Jama’at%20Nusrat,indiscriminate%20attacks%20on%20government%20forces. [35] International Organization for Migration, “Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Libya’s Migrant Report: Round 48 (May - June 2023) - Libya,” ReliefWeb, October 31, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/displacement-tracking-matrix-dtm-libyas-migrant-report-round-48-may-june-2023#:~:text=IOM%20Libya’s%20Displacement%20Tracking%20Matrix,(May%20%2D%20June%202023). [36] USA for UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency, “Sahel Refugee Crisis,” USA for UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency, accessed May 14, 2024, https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/sahel-crisis/#:~:text=More%20than%204.2%20million%20people,region%20(as%20of%202023). [37] James Tapsfield, “Nineteen EU Countries Demand the Right to Introduce Rwanda-Style Deportation Schemes amid Signs the UK’s New Law Is Already Having a Deterrent Effect,” Daily Mail Online, May 14, 2024, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13416067/EU-Rwanda-deportation-UK-law-deterrent-migrants-Channel.html. [38] Hayley Dixon, “Revealed: How Putin Plans to Flood West with Migrants,” The Telegraph, February 29, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/29/putin-russia-wagner-militia-africa-immigration-europe/. [39] David Mac Dougall, “Russia Using ‘hybrid Warfare’ to Push Migrants over Finnish Border,” News - World - Finland, November 14, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/2023/11/14/finland-says-russia-is-helping-migrants-make-their-way-over-the-eastern-border. [40] Clara Denina, “Anglo American Rejects BHP’s Revised $42.7 Billion Buyout Proposal | Reuters,” Deals, May 13, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/bhp-says-anglo-american-rejected-revised-proposal-2024-05-13/. [41] Colin McClelland, “Barrick’s Mali Mine Feeds Russian War Machine, Advocacy Group Says,” Mining.com, April 30, 2024, https://www.northernminer.com/esg/barricks-mali-mine-feeds-russian-war-machine-group-says/1003866842/. [42] Mansur Abubakar, “Bola Tinubu’s U-Turn on Niger Sanctions Received with Relief in Northern Nigeria,” BBC News, March 16, 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68563579. [43] Alia Brahimi, “Russia Is Profiting from an Oil Corruption Binge in Libya,” Newsweek, April 29, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-profiting-oil-corruption-binge-libya-opinion-1895350. 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